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Stealing Lot’s Wife and Daughters from the Bible: A 
Response to Rozmarin’s ‘Staying Alive’ 
 
Introduction 
I very much welcome the appearance of Rozmarin’s essay, 
which offers a fascinating feminist re-telling of the 
Biblical story of Lot’s wife. I am in sympathy with 
Rozmarin’s premises that we need to re-write the cultural 
scripts that frame lived mother-daughter relationships 
and that we need to do so by re-reading and re-
appropriating inherited stories of mothers and daughters. 
I was immediately intrigued by Rozmarin’s choice of the 
story of Lot’s wife and daughters for her re-reading and 
re-appropriation – intrigued because on the face of it 
this tale is a distinctly unpromising source for any 
feminist re-appropriation, and in particular for the 
particular kind of re-appropriation that Rozmarin seeks. 
Rozmarin wishes to steal the figure of Lot’s wife, 
turned into a pillar of salt because she looks back at 
the sinful city of Sodom that she, Lot, and their 
daughters are fleeing. Rozmarin’s aim is to elicit ways 
that Lot’s wife refuses to comply with the injunction 
that we must commit psychical matricide, the transmission 
of which is arguably at the kernel of Western culture. 
The injunction is stated by Kristeva amongst others: ‘For 
man and for woman the loss of the mother is a biological 
 2 
and psychic necessity, the first step on the way to 
autonomy. Matricide is our vital necessity, the sine qua 
non of our individuation’ (Kristeva 1989, p. 38). Whether 
it is really an invariant psychical necessity for 
everyone that they should make this kind of sharp and 
violent mental and emotional break from their mothers, 
and from the entire field of the maternal, has recently 
been contested by several feminist theorists (see, e.g., 
Jacobs 2007, Stone 2012). But these theorists accept that 
in fact Western culture has treated matricide as 
necessary, with real lived consequences for all of its 
inhabitants. The resulting feminist project is to work 
towards creating cultural change, change in which we 
would cease to treat matricide as being necessary, and 
instead be guided by cultural models of positive 
relations with one’s maternal origins.  
It is in the context of this project of creating 
cultural change that Rozmarin returns to Lot’s wife. Yet 
she is killed, whilst her daughters and husband escape to 
continue their lives without her. That is the kernel of 
Lot’s wife’s story, and to that extent it is difficult to 
re-read her figure as one that is anti-matricidal. Of 
course, it is not the case that Lot’s daughters literally 
kill his wife; she is killed by God, either as punishment 
or as a side-effect of his destruction of Sodom. Despite 
that, we can see the text as specifying that Lot’s wife 
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must be killed for her daughters to become mothers 
themselves and take up their own places in culture, as 
they subsequently do. Thus a matricidal message is in 
effect conveyed, where it is through similarly indirect 
and figurative means that the injunction to commit 
matricide is most often transmitted overall – it is 
relatively rare for it to receive the sort of explicit 
prescriptive formulation that it receives from Kristeva. 
With all this said, I think that Rozmarin does a 
powerful job of recovering positive meanings from this 
ostensibly bleak tale, unearthing anti-matricidal 
possibilities in the tale beyond the matricidal 
injunction that it manifestly communicates. In my 
response I want, first, I want to fill in some more of 
what I take to be the intellectual background to and 
rationale for Rozmarin’s anti-matricidal project. Then, 
second, I will pursue some further possibilities of 
alternative meanings contained in the figures of Lot’s 
wife and daughters, inspired by but not wholly convergent 
with the paths followed by Rozmarin. In that light I will 
conclude by circling back to broader questions concerning 
the feminist project of stealing female figures from 
texts of the patriarchal tradition. 
 
1. Matricidal History and Cultural Re-Reading 
Rozmarin is explicit that her project is informed and 
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guided by Luce Irigaray’s critique of the erasure of 
mother-daughter genealogies that Irigaray identifies as a 
structural feature of Western culture(s). This is so not 
only in that descent and the transmission of property 
have generally passed through the male line but also in a 
psychical sense that our culture destines women to have 
acute difficulties in situating themselves psychically 
vis-à-vis their mothers. These difficulties arise because 
becoming a self, in Western culture, has been taken to 
require a break from the background of maternal bodily 
care in which people have their beginnings (it having 
been the social norm for mothers to be the principal 
givers of that care).
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 Yet if one is to assume a female 
identity, one cannot break from that maternal background, 
because one needs to identify with one’s own mother to 
assume a female identity – since it is through that 
identification that the basis of a female identity is 
established. Thus the dilemma is as follows: One can 
either be a non-female self or, if one is to be female, a 
non-self or non-subject, in which case woman ‘submits to 
being objectified by discourse – insofar as she is 
“female”’ (Irigaray 1985a, p. 133). 
 To be sure, these claims about ‘Western culture’ and 
its effects on the female psyche are highly generalised. 
In this connection Rozmarin raises important questions 
about how we can combine an Irigarayan-type critical 
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perspective on ‘Western culture’s’ preclusion of female 
subjectivity with attention to the intersectionality of 
different forms of oppression and power relations. The 
fact of these intersections suggests that there can be no 
single uniform way in which female subjectivity is denied 
or impeded: if cultural scripts mediate the difficulties 
of becoming a woman, and different power relations and 
oppressive systems shape these mediations, then it seems 
that the opposition between subjectivity and femininity 
cannot take the single shape that Irigaray critiques. Or 
are there merely many different variations on one 
universal pattern of opposition? So I suspect Irigaray 
would say. I also believe that she is wrong, although I 
cannot fully examine this question here.  
I have previously argued, though, that the meanings 
of matricide and the self have changed fundamentally over 
the course of Western history (Stone 2011). In the 
classical world, as presented above all by the Oresteia, 
matricide was taken to be necessary for one to become a 
self in the sense of a full participant in the community 
of the polis. In the Judaeo-Christian tradition, as 
established above all by the texts of the Old and New 
Testament, matricide is necessary for becoming a self qua 
full participant in the spiritual community united under 
God. In modernity, matricide is instead taken to be 
necessary if one is to become an autonomous individual 
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subject, the author and architect of the meaning of one’s 
experience and of the normative authority of the values 
and meanings to which one commits oneself. Furthermore, 
the classical and modern worlds and the Judaeo-Christian 
traditions all contain many diverse strands; it is only 
in their dominant strands that they uphold versions of 
matricide. Saying this does not address intersecting 
power relations, but it does suggest a starting-point for 
treating matricide as taking a plurality of historical 
forms, not one single invariant form. 
Returning to Irigaray’s analysis of women’s 
relations with their mothers and with the maternal, women 
face the options of either repudiating or remaining 
identified with them. But in the latter case a woman has 
no means of adequately differentiating herself from her 
mother or from the field of maternal corporeality, 
because to differentiate herself she would have to carry 
out the mental processes by which one establishes 
difference between oneself and the other (i.e. the 
maternal background). The only available script to guide 
such processes, though, is that of repudiating this 
background, which one cannot do if one is remain 
identified with it. This is not to say that women take 
one or the other alternative (repudiation or mergence). 
Generally, women combine both; but this is not a happy 
combination but an uncomfortable straddling of two 
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incompatible alternatives, involving a painful splitting 
of the self.  
In sum, from Irigaray’s perspective, the problem is 
that Western culture (or cultures) allow no female 
subject-position – that ‘any theory of the “subject” will 
have always been appropriated as “masculine”’ (Irigaray 
1985a, p. 133). And this is entwined with the problem 
that mother-daughter relationships are in irresolvable 
tension. Thus, Irigaray concludes, 
When I speak of the relation to the mother, I 
mean that, in our patriarchal culture, the 
daughter is absolutely unable to resolve her 
relation to her mother. Nor can the woman resolve 
her relation to maternity, unless she reduces 
herself to it. … [Under this cultural script] 
there is no difference between being a mother and 
being a woman, … there is no articulation to be 
made, by the woman, between these two desires of 
hers. (Irigaray 1985b, p. 143) 
Irigaray insists that patriarchal culture (or 
cultures) need to change in directions that would permit 
daughters to differentiate themselves psychically from 
their mothers whilst remaining female, and so whilst 
retaining a form of identification with their mothers and 
with the maternal which nonetheless permits 
differentiation. One of the necessary conditions of 
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possibility of this scenario, Irigaray believes, is new 
cultural mediations, new scripts that would help us to 
imagine and conceive of the possibility of our 
differentiating ourselves from our mothers while 
continuing to identify with them. But it is not a 
question of dreaming up new stories that are quite unlike 
anything we have known before. Inevitably, new cultural 
mediations must be produced by re-working and re-writing 
the existing ones – otherwise we will onlyinvent the 
wheel, trying to imagine things wholly unlike the past 
whilst actually re-creating the past unknowingly. 
Accordingly Irigaray returns to the ancient Greek myth of 
Demeter and Persephone, also mentioning the relationship 
of Mary to her mother Anne (Irigaray 1994: 89-112).  
It is Adriana Cavarero who most fully develops the 
kind of practice of re-reading the past for which 
Irigaray’s work calls. In her book In Spite of Plato, 
Cavarero recasts a series of female figures from the 
classical world: Penelope, for example, the Odyssey’s 
model of the faithful wife, awaiting her husband’s return 
and preserving her loyalty by endlessly undoing the 
weaving that she has completed each day so as to retain 
her pretext for deferring her suitors. So Penelope seems 
to preserve Odysseus’s patriarchal power over his domain, 
his house and lands, which she keeps waiting for him. And 
yet, as Cavarero beautifully writes, 
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Homeric memory has tried, of course, to load the 
figure of Penelope with [patriarchal] … 
attributions. … But the figure as such – as 
material for myth – has a certain malleability 
with respect to these interpretive intentions. 
Penelope has a symbolic power of her own that is 
open to different readings. Thus Homer’s sketch 
disseminates possibilities for other possible 
hermeneutical trajectories. These are clues for 
a female symbolic order that has its own rhythms 
and spaces, that seeks its figures by stealing 
them from a context that has dealt with them 
otherwise. (Cavarero 1995, p. 13) 
The strategy, then, is one of theft – as Cixous also 
proposed (1989, p. 97). Cavarero steals Penelope from 
Homer, suggesting that through her daily repeated weaving 
and unweaving she creates a slowed-down temporality quite 
unlike the linear time of history in which patriarchal 
power struggles take place. Penelope staves off any 
wedding; at the same time, she staves off the return of 
Odysseus himself. Revealingly, she does not recognise 
Odysseus when he finally arrives, insists on having 
proofs of his identity, and, it seems, does not want to 
recognise him. Thus, it was not that Penelope staved off 
her suitors to preserve Odysseus’s dominion; rather, she 
was staving off the patriarchal regime and its 
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temporality altogether, including the time when Odysseus 
would return and restore her to her subordinate place in 
his household. 
 
2. Lot’s Wife and Daughters 
I take it that this practice of stealing female figures 
from the places they are allotted within the very 
patriarchal texts that refer to them provides inspiration 
for Rozmarin’s essay. One obvious candidate for theft 
from the Bible is the story of Ruth and her mother-in-law 
Naomi, notably the anti-matricidal lines in which Ruth 
declares to Naomi (who admittedly is Ruth’s mother by 
marriage, not birth): 
Entreat me not to leave thee, or to return from 
following after thee: for whither thou goest, I will 
go; and where thou lodgest, I will lodge: thy people 
shall be my people, and thy God my God: Where thou 
diest, will I die, and there will I be buried: the 
Lord do so to me, and more also, if aught but death 
part thee and me. (Ruth 1: 16-17)
2
 
Rozmarin turns instead to the ostensibly bleak tale 
of Lot’s wife in Genesis 19, bleak because the position 
assigned Lot’s wife seems so clearly fixed by patriarchy. 
We never learn her name, nor those of her daughters, 
their identities being entirely defined by their 
relations to Lot; and where Lot’s wife deviates from this 
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constraint by looking back when Lot does not, she is 
turned to salt (Genesis 19: 26). Moreover, her story is 
entirely framed within that of Lot – the essentials of 
which are these. A righteous man, Lot is warned by two 
angels that the city of Sodom where he and his family 
live is imminently to be destroyed by God, in punishment 
for its inhabitants’ sins. Lot and family are hastened by 
the angels to safety, but during their flight Lot’s wife 
looks back and is turned to a pillar of salt. The moral? 
Most straightforwardly: ‘Do not retain any lingering 
longing for the sinful people amongst whom you’ve been 
living, but leave them steadfastly behind on your journey 
towards righteousness’. 
What are the sins of the Sodomites for which Lot’s 
wife retains this note of longing? In received common-
sense their sin is to permit sex between men, ‘sodomy’. 
Although Genesis 19 leaves this unstated, that received 
meaning gets support from Jude 7, which says that the 
Sodomites ‘gave themselves over to fornication, and went 
after strange flesh’. Rozmarin, however, suggests that 
the Sodomites were hostile and close-minded towards 
strangers. Yet further details of Lot’s story suggest 
that the Sodomites’ sins at least included acceptance of 
sex between men – and these details diminish the story’s 
savour even further from a feminist perspective. When the 
angels visit Lot, men of Sodom ranging from young to old 
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clamour to ‘know’ them (Genesis 19: 5). Lot tries to 
dissuade these men by offering them his two virgin 
daughters to ‘do to them as is good in their eyes’ – the 
men’s eyes, that is (Genesis 19: 8). By implication, 
then, it was actually sex that the men wanted of the 
angels, hence Lot’s attempt to dissuade them by offering 
them the chance to have sex with his daughters instead. 
Lot shows himself here to be an emblematic patriarch who 
considers sex between men – or perhaps between men and 
angels – more sinful than the gang-rape of his own 
daughters. 
By this point, the Biblical text has introduced the 
first of a succession of inconsistent references to Lot’s 
daughters. According to Genesis 19:14 Lot has two sons-
in-law who have both married daughters of his – sons-in-
law whom Lot warns, to no avail, to leave the city. Then 
Lot flees, with his wife and two daughters (Genesis 
19:15, 19:16). So are the daughters married or not? Do 
they escape from Sodom or not? One solution, adopted by 
Rozmarin, is to take Lot to have four daughters, two 
married and abandoned to destruction with their husbands, 
and two unmarried, who escape. 
Later, these two escaped daughters have taken refuge 
in a cave with Lot, and they agree with one another to 
get Lot drunk on successive nights and have intercourse 
with him so as to become pregnant. What are their 
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motivations? They say that there is no other man 
available to them; they also say, each in succession, 
that they want to ‘preserve [the] seed of [their] father’ 
(Genesis 19: 32 and 34). They seem to accomplish this 
goal, bearing sons through whom Abraham’s line continues. 
This textual material is the basis of Rozmarin’s 
ingenious re-reading. The punishment meted out to Lot’s 
wife is extremely harsh, especially when Lot too had 
delayed the departure from Sodom and had to be hastened 
out by the angels. Admittedly, I’m assuming that Lot’s 
wife’s petrification is a punishment and not merely the 
effect of the conflagration spreading to her, as if to 
someone looking at a nuclear explosion. Even in that 
case, her death remains the side-effect of the 
prohibition on bodies circulating outside of patrilineal 
and patriarchal terms, which the Sodomites have sinfully 
failed to observe. Rozmarin points out, though, that in 
her fate Lot’s wife embodies the paradox of witnessing. 
To bear witness to a catastrophe one must participate in 
it and so be consumed by it; but then one is no longer 
there to bear witness. If on the other hand one survives, 
then one is at enough distance from the catastrophe that 
one can no longer truly witness to its full extent. Lot’s 
wife, though, turned to a pillar of salt, witnesses the 
destruction of Sodom as she looks back at it, and is 
consumed in doing so, caught up in this destruction of 
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all life. Yet she remains a witness nonetheless – 
becoming a monument that, like a gravestone, records and 
serves as a reminder of the fate of Sodom and its people; 
made of salt, a symbol of fidelity and preservation (as 
when used to preserve food). She ‘solves’ the paradox, or 
rather embodies both horns of the dilemma of witnessing 
at once by becoming a non-living witness; she thereby 
bears faithful witness, by succumbing fully to the fate 
of the Sodomites. 
Furthermore, Rozmarin proposes, Lot’s wife looks 
back in regret – at leaving behind her married daughters, 
her home, her city. She looks back because she cannot 
simply discard without a backward glance the ties that 
have bound her, the relationships she has maintained over 
time. She retains a level of fidelity, again, this time 
to her past. She is unable simply to repudiate her 
background, which would be a matricidal gesture. It would 
obey the law: ‘Commit matricide in order to join the 
spiritual community of those united under God’. But it 
would also obey a further law embedded in the first: ‘Do 
not mourn, regret, or grieve for the lost maternal body, 
for it was worthless, you have lost nothing’. 
Because she cannot commit matricide Lot’s wife ends 
up destroyed, consumed. Hence, her story appears to 
convey very starkly the cultural requirement of 
matricide. The alternative, if one insists on being 
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faithful to one’s maternal past, is to suffer death by 
petrification, by turning to salt – which is barren and 
unfruitful, has no future, no line of descent: the 
message being that the maternal body may reproduce only 
under the aegis of patriarchal transmission. What other 
imperatives we take the story to convey depends on what 
we take Sodom’s sins to consist in. Given that 
townspeople gather at Lot’s house wanting to ‘know’ the 
angels, one interpretation is that within Sodom bodies 
and pleasures are permitted to circulate outside the 
hetero-patriarchal framework that Lot seeks to re-enforce 
by offering his daughters to the crowd. Perhaps it’s this 
ill-defined possibility of pleasures that exceed the 
patriarchal framework towards which Lot’s wife looks back 
in longing. 
Turning to Lot’s daughters, let me explore some 
senses in which they resist the imperative to commit 
matricide, again somewhat divergent from those unearthed 
by Rozmarin but building on the openings that she has 
created. For Rozmarin, the mother’s act of witnessing and 
remaining faithful to the past and loss is an ethical 
gesture that enables her daughters to create a positive 
genealogical relation. The mother’s backward look 
testified to the value of life that she recognised in 
feeling, not shutting herself off from, the sorrow and 
loss of Sodom’s life being destroyed. The daughters take 
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up their mother’s testimony by recognising and valuing 
life, which they do so at a bodily level, in creating new 
life for themselves, directly, in pregnancy and birth. 
Now, according to the King James rendition, the 
daughters want to continue their father’s line – the ur-
patriarchal line, descending from Abraham. Leaving behind 
the barren place to which their mother was consigned, the 
daughters bear fruit, by attaching themselves to the 
father’s line and not the mother’s body. But even if this 
is what the daughters want to accomplish, it can hardly 
be said that the daughters succeed unequivocally in 
carrying on the paternal line, for their sons by their 
father are also their brothers. Rather like Oedipus and 
Antigone, at least as Judith Butler re-interprets them in 
Antigone’s Claim (2000), the daughters end up with 
confused, crossed kin relations. The patriarchal line has 
been interrupted, broken, in that Lot was poised to have 
no sons or sons-in-law; then the line has been stitched 
up again, but imperfectly so, for he gains two sons who 
are at once his grandsons, in whom his line of descent is 
muddied. The story of Lot’s daughters thus exposes the 
imperfections of the patriline – its failure seamlessly 
to pass goods from origin to destination in an unbroken 
transmission, and its interruption by gaps, breaks, and 
multiplications. 
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Besides, the text actually suggests that the 
daughters have other motivations than that of 
perpetuating the paternal line. Where the King James 
Version says that they wish to ‘preserve [the] seed of 
[their father’, a more literal translation of the 
original – U’Nechayeh meiavinu zera – is that they wish 
to ‘give life to [Nechayeh] offspring [Zera] through 
[their] father’ (Me’avinu – ‘from our father’) (Genesis 
19: 32, this phrase being repeated by the other sister at 
34).
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 Moreover, the sisters explicitly claim to do this 
because there are no other men available. This implies 
that their overriding aim is simply to bear children – or 
to give life, as Rozmarin has it – rather than to 
transmit their father’s lineage.  
Perhaps, then, in setting out to have children, the 
sisters are trying to find a replacement for their two 
siblings who have died in Sodom. Alternatively, by 
becoming a mother each sister comes to stand to the other 
one as a replacement for their lost mother – so that what 
they re-create is not so much the father’s line as the 
mother’s body. This is so in two ways. First, in that the 
two sisters agree together to get pregnant by their 
father; they mirror one another in words and deeds, and 
once pregnant they can in looking at one another find in 
the other’s body a reflection of their own motherhood. 
Second, the daughters become de facto mothers to one 
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another through the kinship relations that their 
reproductive acts have scrambled. In that each of them is 
coupled with the father, she occupies the position vis-à-
vis her sibling that their mother formerly held. The 
sisters come to stand as mothers to one another in 
lineage as well as body. 
Through this strategy the daughters re-create 
maternal bodies that are fruitful, not turned to salt; 
alive, not dead; the maternal body has been re-animated, 
where God’s imperatives had sought to destroy it and 
render it barren. To some extent, this re-animation is 
permitted because the daughters’ reproductive 
functionings now serve the transmission of Lot’s paternal 
line (even if this is not their explicit intention). But 
to the extent that that line is also scrambled, the 
maternal body is operating outside of service of 
patriarchy, creating life and potentials for descent on 
independent terms. 
However, there is also a less hopeful interpretive 
possibility. Namely, that each sister has taken their 
mother’s place, fulfilling the fantasy at the heart of 
the female Oedipus complex, namely that of killing the 
mother and taking her place as the father’s lover. 
Evidently, this complex is bound up with a fantasy of 
matricide, yet at the same time it involves the 
daughter’s and mother’s identities being merged, as in 
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Irigaray’s diagnosis. Their identities are conflated to 
the point that the daughter can take up a female position 
within intersubjective relationships only by taking her 
mother’s position and, in so doing, violently ousting her 
mother from it.  
However, in Genesis 19 the two daughters have agreed 
each in succession, under identical words, to have 
children by their father. They make a pact to share their 
father, and so, implicitly, that each of them will share 
him with their mother, assuming that to each of them the 
other sister stands in the mother’s position insofar as 
she couples with their father. The agreement, then, is 
that the sisters will not kill their mother – or one 
another – in murderous rivalry but will co-exist 
alongside one another. In making this pact the sisters 
diverge from the divine law that turns their mother to 
salt, instituting an alternative script. This importance 
of there being two daughters, mirrors of one another, is 
reflected in the text’s ambiguities about how many 
daughters Lot has. Not only do the two daughters speak 
and act alike, but there is also the further pair of two 
daughters, where it is unclear whether they are the same 
as the first pair or not: a doubling of a doubling, 
making the motif of mirroring highly salient. Perhaps, 
then, the daughters succeed in enacting a relationship of 
identification and difference, not only with each other 
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but also with their mother as they remember and imagine 
her. 
 
3. Engaging with the Past 
These have only been suggestions, possible ways of 
unravelling and re-weaving the strands of the Biblical 
text, following lines opened up by Rozmarin. But finally 
I want to come back to the unpropitious character of the 
episode of Lot’s wife from the perspective of re-
scripting mother-daughter relations. Despite all that 
Rozmarin has said, and the further intra-textual seeds of 
hope that she prompts us to explore, there remains an 
obstacle in the way of finding a model here of living, 
loving mother-daughter relationships. This is the fact 
that Lot’s wife is killed and her daughters left to go on 
without her, and to copulate with their father in their 
mother’s absence. To this extent matricide is carried 
out, symbolically and psychically. Lot’s daughters are at 
best endeavouring to re-create, through their 
relationship with one another, a liveable relationship 
with their mother – but only as they remember and imagine 
her after her death, not as an actual flesh-and-blood 
mother who remained amongst them. 
Yet in this very respect the situation of Lot’s 
daughters arguably parallels that of women generally to 
the extent that we inhabit cultures that insist upon the 
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necessity of matricide, psychically speaking. Insofar as 
we have each carried out a psychical act of matricide to 
become subjects, but then wish to challenge this paradigm 
of subjecthood, we have to re-weave a positive relation 
with our mothers and with the maternal where our culture 
has interdicted this. That said, I suspect that we never 
do fully act upon the cultural injunction to commit 
matricide, and that our subjectivity is always formed in 
more positive relations with our mothers and with the 
others who give us quasi-maternal care. Even so, the 
broader injunction to commit matricide remains, being 
carried and conveyed by many facets of our cultures. 
Insofar as we cannot avoid negotiating that injunction, 
even if we do so by resisting or failing to act upon it, 
our predicaments retain affinities with those of Lot’s 
daughters. And, like them, we stand in need of new 
cultural mediations. 
More than this, perhaps there is positive value in 
the very fact that the story to which Rozmarin turns is 
unpropitious from the point of view of opposing 
matricide. After all, we cannot create new cultural 
mediations by dreaming them up entirely ex nihilo – this 
is impossible and so only liable to lead to the 
unintended re-invention of the wheel. We are more likely 
to create cultural mediations that offer something 
genuinely new by engaging with figures and stories of the 
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patriarchal past whilst endeavouring to uncover in these 
figures possibilities that run against the very meanings 
that the patriarchal texts assign them. Inevitably, then, 
in looking for new figures of positive mother-daughter 
connections we need to revisit older matricidal stories 
and find alternative possibilities within them. Or as 
Rozmarin puts it, ‘The cultural resources that women have 
for creating non-matricidal relations are driven from 
these [existing, inherited cultural] components and their 
cultural excess’. But because those components under 
their earlier meanings are matricidal, our re-castings 
and re-readings will always carry traces of those 
meanings. We cannot craft something wholly and 
unambiguously positive out of a negative past; some of 
the negativity will remain within any new positivity. 
Furthermore, to try to leap out of this past and its 
negative meanings entirely would be to succumb to a 
matricidal fantasy: the fantasy of leaving one’s origins 
behind, breaking apart from this shaping background into 
one’s own totally separate and autonomous identity.  
Interestingly, this is the very fantasy in which 
Lot’s wife is unwilling or unable to indulge when she 
looks back at the past that has shaped her and to which 
she has been attached. In re-reading and tarrying with 
the patriarchal past, then, we come full circle and 
remember Lot’s wife. We do so by re-enacting her gesture: 
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that of looking backwards, remaining connected to our 
backgrounds and resisting the symbolic law that commands 
us to break from those backgrounds absolutely.  
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1
 Irigaray never makes it clear whether she thinks that 
mothers provide bodily care for young children by virtue 
of social norms – the gender division of labour – or by 
virtue of biology, or some mixture of the two. In 
contrast some other feminist theorists, such as Chodorow 
(1978), hold that it is now entirely a result of social 
norms that mothers are the principal child-carers, 
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although in early periods biology played more of a causal 
role. Either way, insofar as mothers’ child-caring role 
is at least partly a consequence of social norms, those 
norms obtain in tandem with the cultural imperative that 
we commit matricide in order to become selves. For given 
this imperative, becoming a self involves repudiating the 
background of maternal bodily care; therefore providing 
this care for others and re-immersing oneself in this 
maternal field is devalued, seen as undesirable. Rather 
than the powerful seeking to share in caring for young 
children, then, they will always be motivated to push off 
this responsibility onto those who are less powerful, and 
in particular onto women or the least powerful women, 
since women can never fully escape the devalued maternal 
realm anyway. 
2
 All passages from the Bible are cited according to the 
King James Version. 
3
 My thanks to Gordon Brandt for clarifying this to me, 
informed by the Artscroll translation. 
